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DEGREES OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
One of.the most ancient of all legal doctrines is the "best evi-
dence rule," although originally it had a much broader meaning
than at present. According to the early view, it meant that only
the best evidence which could be produced was admissible, it was
applicable to all classes of evidence and not confined to documents.
In its modern application, however, the best evidence rule amounts
only to the requirement that the contents of a written instrument
must be proved by the introduction of the writing itself, unless
its absence is satisfactorily accounted for. The reason for this law
of evidence is obvious-the original is the primary evidence of its
own contents and precludes the inaccuracies that might appear in
copies or parol testimony, it serves as a protection against fraud
and mistake.
This interesting development of such an important rule has
resulted in great confusion as to what the term "best evidence"
signifies. Whereas it was originally interpreted quite literally, it
has now come to have an altogether different meaning-one not in
harmony with the connotation of its title. By substituting the word
"primary" for the word "best," a more accurate descriptive term
is had, and it is in this sense that the expression "best evidence"
is used in this article.
The loss or destruction of a writing, if satisfactorily shown, opens
the door for the admission of what is known as secondary evidence
of its contents. This type of proof is that which is not the original
but tends to prove the contents of the latter.1 Such evidence is
allowed because it is impossible to produce the original and if its
contents are to be proved at all it must be by resorting to other
proof thereof, which is necessarily of an inferior grade.
But when one has proven circumstances justifying the introduc-
tion of secondary evidence, must he produce the very best obtain-
able or will any proof be sufficient 9 For instance, must he produce
a written copy of the original if it exists, or may he, notwithstand-
1 In Youroveta Home and Foreign Trade Company (1924) 297 Fed. 723.
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ing the existence of such a copy, give parol testimony of the con-
tents of the document I To require the production of the copy is to
say that there are degrees of secondary evidence, while to adopt
the other position is to assert that no such degrees exist-that any
kind of secondary evidence is equally admissible. The latter is
known as "the English rule," while the contrary doctrine is desig-
nated as "the American rule." It must be borne in mind, how-
ever, that these terms have very little significance, as there are
decisions supporting each rule to be found in both the English and
American reports.
THE ENGLisH RULE
The court, in the leading English case of Doe d. Gilbert v. Ross
(1840)2, clearly states the rule credited to that country, saying
"We think there are no degres of secondary evidence.
The rule is, that if you cannot produce the original, you
can give parol evidence of its contents. If, indeed, the
party giving such parol evidence appears to have better
secondary evidence in his power, which he does not pro-
duce, that is a fact to go to the jury, from which they
might sometimes presume that the evidence kept back
should be adverse to the party withholding it. But the law
makes no distinction between one class of secondary evi-
dence and another."
This rule, as applied in the United States, is the best illustrated
by the Massachusetts case of Goodrich v. Weston (1869), 3 in which
the court spoke as follows
"When the source of original evidence is exhausted, and
resort is properly had to secondary evidence, the contents
of private writings may be proved, like any other fact by
indirect evidence. The admissibility of evidence offered for
this purpose must depend upon its legitimate tendency to
prove the facts sought to be proved, and not upon the
comparative weight or value of one or another form of
proof. The jury will judge of its weight and may give due
consideration to the fact that a more satisfactory one
exists and is withheld, or not produced, when it might
readily have been obtained. But there are no degrees of
legal distinction in this class of evidence."
As illustrations of this view it has been held that, to prove a
marriage settlement, a shorthand writer's notes of a former trial at
7 Mees & W 102, 10 L. J. Ex. 201.
102 Mass. 362, 3 Am. Rep. 469.
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which the settlement was proved admissible, even though a copy is
in court4 that if the testimony of a deceased witness is to be proved,
any person who heard the testimony may be called, although the
latter was accurately taken down by a stenographer 5 , that a party
may give parol evidence of the contents of a lost letter, though it
is shown that he has a copy in his possession 6 , that parol evidence
of the contents of an insurance policy is admissible, even though a
copy is obtainable7 that a copy of a copy may be introduced, though
the latter was in the possession of the same person8 , that parol testi-
mony of the contents of a bond may be given notwithstanding the
fact that a copy is known to exist 9 , and that a power of attorney
may be proved by verbal testimony, although the party introducing
the evidence could have produced a copy'10
This rule has the support of such writers as Starkie," Phillips, 2
Browne,13 Chamberlayne,' 4 Stephen,15 Best,16 McKelvie'17 Taylor,18
and Greenleaf '" who advance the argument that a contrary hold-
mg (that there are degrees of secondary evidence) confounds all
distinction between the weight of evidence and its legal adiissi-
bility Their theory is that the best evidence rule is founded upon
the nature of the evidence offered and not upon its strength or
weakness-that primary evidence should be required if available,
and if not, that secondary proof should be accepted, its weight to be
determined by the judge or jury Hence they say that all so-called
"degrees" of secondary evidence are equally admissible, but that
their weight may vary according to the circumstances surround-
mg their introduction and their tendency to prove the facts in-
volved. Thus, if a party introduces parol evidence of the contents
of a deed when he is shown to have a copy in his possession, this
is a fact to be considered by the court in determunnig the weight
of the evidence offered.
I Supra note 2.
'Jeans v. Wheedon (1843), 2 Moody & R. 486.
"People v. Chrstian (1906), 144 Mich. 247, 107 N. W 919.
7 Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Dill (1878), 91 Ill. 174.
SCanweron v. Peck (1871), 37 Conn. 555.
0 Carpenter v. Dame (1858), 10 Ind. 125.
"°Eslow v. Mitchell (1873) 26 Mich. 500.
"Starkie on Evidence (9th Am. Ed.), p. 498.
"22 Philips on Evidence (10th Eng. Ed.), p. 568.
Browne, Short Studies in Evidence, p. 145.
111 Chamberlayne on Evidence, p. 610.
3 Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence (2nd Am. Ed.), p. 191.
" 2 Best on Evidence (1st Am. Ed.), p. 820.
17 McKelvie Hornbook on Evidence (2nd Ed.), p. 433.
18 Taylor on Evidence.
101 Greenleaf (15th Am. Ed.) p. 129.
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It is insisted that the American rule often tends to the subversion
of justice and always is productive of inconvenience. For example,
if proof of the existence of an abstract of a deed will exclude oral
evidence of its contents, this proof may be withheld by the adverse
party until the moment of the trial, and the other side be defeated,
or the cause greatly delayed thereby To eliminate this danger the
supporters of the English doctrine urge that a party should be
allowed to put in such proof as he can or desires to produce, its
weight to be determined by its nature and the circumstances sur-
rounding its introduction. Thus, if one is surprised at the time of
trial by being informed of the existence of better secondary evi-
dence, he is not unduly penalized, while if he suppresses such
evidence himself, he must suffer the effect of the presumption which
his actions raise.
THE AMERICAN RULE
The American rule is well illustrated by the leading case of
Harvey v Thorpe (1856) ,20 in which the court says
"Although the facts may warrant the admission of
secondary evidence, the best kind of that character of
evidence which appears to be in the power of the party to
produce must be offered."
The United States Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows
"Proof of the contents of a lost paper ought to be the
best the party has in his power to produce, and, at all
events, such as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the sub-
stantive parts of the paper."
Some of the states, however, while asserting that there are de-
grees of secondary evidence, are more liberal in their application
of the rule, holding that when the nature of the case does not of
itself disclose the existence of better secondary evidence, a party
will not be required to produce the latter unless it can be shown
that he knew of its existence.2-' This is a compromise rule developed
to meet the argument raised by the supporters of the English
doctrine and it must be admitted that it at least overcomes some
of the practical objections to the strict interpretation of the Amer
ican theory, at least it prevents embarrassing situations and delays
-' 28 Ala. 250, 65 Am. Dec. 344.
21 Renner v. Bank of Columbia (1824) 9 Wheat. 581, 6 L. Ed. 166.
21 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (15th Ed.) p. 130.
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caused by surprise. However, it cannot be denied that it is a de-
parture from the reasoning underlying the American rule-that
the "next best evidence" obtainable must be produced. This in-
terpretation of the law will be referred to n this article as the
liberal application of the American rule.
The following decisions, among others, illustrate the theory that
there are degrees of secondary evidence, where it is proved that
a copy of a will can be produced, parol evidence of its contents is
inadmissible23 , an offer to prove the contents of a letter by parol
was held to be properly rejected where it appeared from the proofs
that the plaintiffs had in their possession a facsimile of the original
letter which they failed to produce24 , where a copy of a note can
be produced, parol evidence is improper 25 , parol evidence of the
contents of a deed is admissible when a copy is available26 , and oral
testimony cannot be resorted to to prove the contents of an insur-
ance policy when a copy can be obtained.2 7
It cannot be denied that the American rule savors strongly of
the "next best evidence doctrine" - the theory underlying the
original "best evidence rule." Wigmore seems to favor it in a
modified form,28 while Jones argues vigorously for its adoption. 29
However, it should be noted that Jones is one of the few modern
writers who still clings to the old interpretation of the best evi-
dence law.
The arguments advanced in support of the theory that there are
degrees of secondary evidence are all consistent with the ancient
theory that one must produce the best evidence of which the case,
in its nature, is susceptible. It is claimed that it follows as a neces-
sary corollary from this proposition that if certain species of
secondary evidence be manifestly better and more likely to con-
tam a true account of what was in the original than others, a
party ought not to be allowed to resort to the latter until his in-
capacity to produce the former be demonstrated. A copy, the
correctness of which is sworn to by a witness who has compared it
with the original, is far more to be relied on, it is urged, than the
mere memory of that witness as to the contents of the latter, both on
The IRlinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner (1874), 75 Ill. 315.
2 Stevenson v. Hoy (1862), 43 Pa. 191.
2 United States v. Britton (1822) 24 Fed. Case. No. 14,650, 2 Mason 464.
mSupra note 20.
Cummsngs v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co. (1911), 153 Ia. 579, 134. N. W 79, 37
L. R. A. (n.s.) 1169, Ann. Case 1913E 235.
2 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), p. 903.
-12 Jones on Evidence (2nd Ed.), p. 1563.
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account of the comparative imperfection of all verbal testimony,
when compared with written, and also that, in such a case, the
utmost which any witness under ordinary circumstances can be
expected to remember of the contents of a writing in which he is
not interested is its leading features, he is not likely to recall
conditions, limitations, or particular words used in it, which might,
however, have a most material effect in altering or qualifying its
meaning.
Strange as it may seem, although practically all the text writers
prefer the English rule, a majority of the courts of the United
States, which have passed on the question, have adopted the Amer-
ican theory An examination of the cases in which the problem is
considered reveals the fact that this question, although an impor-
tant one, has received but little consideration. Very frequently
courts have adopted the statement of some text writer as to what
the law is without even considering the relative merits of the two
doctrines, and often even without bothering to apply the doctrine of
stare dectsts, all of which has resulted in a hopeless conflict in the
holdings of the various courts on this problem. It is to be noted
that quite a few of the American courts have adopted the so called
English rule, and it should be borne in mind that the geographical
names of the two doctrines have no correlation with the jursdic-
tions in which they are applied.
All the states which have passed on the question are enumerated
herein according to the rule which they have adopted. No effort
has been made to exhaust the authorities for some of the states
and if there are more than three or four decisions m any one
jurisdiction in which the question is definitely settled, only the
latest, best considered, and most representative ones are cited.
STATES FOLLOWING THE ENGLISH RULE
The English rule, that there are no degrees of secondary evi-
dence, has been adopted by the following states
The Supreme Court of CLIF RNIA first held that oral evidence
of the contents of letters was inadmissible when press copies were
available.30 However, in a later case they concluded that, in the
absence of the minute book of a board of directors, "any competent
secondary evidence" was admissible to show what the act of the
board was, oral evidence was accepted when rough minutes were
available.31
30 Ford v. Cunnngham (1890), 87 Cal. 209, 25 Pac. 403.
"aBoggs v. Lakeport Agricadtural Park Assn. (1896), 111 Cal. 354, 43
Pac. 1106.
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In a M]nmE case it was held that where the record of a partition
had been destroyed by fire, the partition was provable by oral evi-
dence, without requiring the demandant to show that an "authen-
ticated copy," authorized by statute, was not in existence.32
MASSACHUSETTS has consistently followed the English doctrine,
their first case having held that a copy of a copy is equally as ad-
missible as the latter itself.33 Goodrich v. Weston (1869),34 is prob-
ably the leading case in the United States supporting this doctrine.
In it the decisions and authorities are reviewed and the conclusion
reached is the result of a very scholarly treatment of the question.
The principle has been followed in subsequent decisions.35
This question has received more attention in MCHIGAN than in
any other state. It was held that if a copy could be obtained, parol
evidence was madmissible.36 Fifteen years later the court switched
to the English rule,37 but in the next case 81 the American theory
was applied. This same doctrine was also followed a few years
later, though two judges dissented.3 9a Notwithstanding these two
consecutive rulings, five judges of the Supreme Court, in People v.
Christian (1906),39 boldly stated that "there are no degrees of
secondary evidence." That the state is hopelessly confused on the
question is shown by the recent case of Baroda State Bank v. Peck
(1926) o40 where the decision of the lower court upholding the
American rule was affirmed by necessity, four judges concluded
that Mlichigan was committed to the English doctrine, while the
others insisted that a copy should be required in preference to parol
evidence.
In MINNESOTA there are but two decisions, these being squarely
in conflict. In the first case the court adopted the English rule,
saying.
"One kind of secondary evidence may be more satis-
factory evidence than another, but it is no more admissible
than any other secondary evidence."
'1 Nasop. v. Jordan (1873), 62 Me. 480.
3Stetson v. Guzliver (1848), 2 Cush. 494.
2' Supra note 3.
s Commonwealth v. Smith (1890), 151 Mass. 491, 24 N. E. 677.
"People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349, 72 Am. Dec. 49 (1858).
"Supra note 10.
"Dillon v. Howe (1893), 98 Mich. 168, 57 N. W 102.
"a Philips v. United, States Benevolent Soc ety (1900), 125 Mich. 186,
84 N. W 57.
" Supra note 6.
"235 Mich. 542, 209 N. W 827.
a Smith v. Hurd (1892) 50 Minn. 503, 52 N. W 922 36 A. S. R. 660.
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A few years later the same court switched to the other extreme
and followed the strict American doctrine by stating the law to
be that42
"In case of loss or destruction (of an instrument) only
the highest grade of secondary evidence obtainable will
answer the requirements of the law This is the only safe
rule."
NEBRASKA has committed itself to the theory that there are no
degrees of secondary evidence."3
In the first NEW YORK case4 4 the Supreme Court adopted the
American rule. The most thoroughly reasoned decision in that
jurisdiction is Reddington v. Gilman (1857), 4 In which the Su-
perior Court, after an extensive review of the authorities, likewise
held that there are degrees of secondary evidence and applied the
liberal rule. The only other decision is a recent holding of the
Supreme Court in which no decisions or authorities are cited, but
the court states that he is "not aware of any rule of law that makes
a distinction of grade in secondary evidence."4 While this adoption
of the English rule is the most recent decision in the state on the
question, it may well be criticized for its utter lack of research and
reasoning.
NORTH CAROLINA, in the first case in which the question arose,
adopted the American rule without discusson,47 and apparently
followed it a few years later, holding that if a copy is obtainable,
oral evidence of the contents of a written document is inadmissible.4 8
However, this decision is based on a quotation from Starkte on Evi-
dence, 49 and that learned writer, in his next sentence (which is
not quoted), says that, "there are no degrees of secondary evi-
dence." This court later definitely adopted the English rule,
saying 0
"There are no degrees (of secondary evidence) When
a party is entitled to give such evidence, he may give any
species of it at his pleasure."
SOUTH CAROLINA has followed its sister state in holding that
42Windom v. Brown (1896) 65 Minn. 394, 67 N. W 1028.
41Rawlings v. Y M. C. A. (1896), 48 Neb. 216, 66 N. W 1124.
41 Niskayuna v. Albany (1824), 2 Cow. 537.
14 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 235.
"Rosenbawn v. Podolsky (1916) 97 Misc. Rep. 614, 162 N. Y. Supp. 227.
Dunas v. Powell (1831) 14 N. C. 103.
Kello v. Maget (1835) 18 N. C. 413.
' Ninth American Edition, p. 496.
Osborne v. Ballew (1847) 29 N. C. 415.
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"there is no division of degrees of proof in case of the loss of an
instrument. "51
There are many decisions in TEXAS that deal with this problem
and all have consistently followed the English rule.
52
STATES FOLLovWnNG THE AmERcAN RULE
The American rule, or the theory that there are degrees of sec-
ondary evidence, is supported by a majority of the jurisdiction, as
follows
The UNITD STATES SUPREME COURT, in the leading case of Rer-
ner v. Bank of Columbnx (1824) 3 adopted this doctrine, saying that
"proof of the contents of a lost paper ought to be the best the party
has in its power to produce." In a subsequent application of the
rule they said that the reason for it was "to promote the ends of
justice and guard against fraud, surprise, and imposition." '5 4 In
other decisions of this court,5 as well as in the determinations of
the lower federal courts,5 6 this same strict interpretation of the
law has been applied.
The ALABAMA case of Curry & Haynee v. Robinson (1847) 5 well
illustrates the application of the liberal interpretation of the
American rule. In that decision the court interpreted the law to be
"that if from the nature of the case itself, it is manifest
that a more satisfactory kind of secondary evidence exists,
the party will be required to produce it, but when the
nature of the case does not of itself disclose the existence
of such better evidence, the objector must not only show
that there is such better evidence but must also prove that
its existence was known to the party offering the inferior
sort."
However, this decision seems to have been overlooked by the court
in deciding the much quoted case of Harvey v. Thorpe (1856),58
and the comparatively recent one of Powers v. Hatter (1907), 59
which hold that "the best kind of (secondary evidence) which
clBeatly v. Southern Ry. Co. (1908), 80 S. C. 527, 61 S. E. 1006.
52 Simpson Bank v. Smith (1908), 52 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 114 S. W 445,
Barclay v. Deyerle (1909), 53 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 116 S. W 123; Rich Fur-
niture Co. v. Smith (1918), 202 S. W 99.
" Supra note 21,
r' Cornett v. Williams (1873) 20 Wall. 226, 22 L. Ed. 254.
I' MePhaul v. Lapsley (1874), 20 Wall. 264, 22 L. Ed. 344.
r' Supra note 25.
a11 Ala. 266.
rSupra note 20.
* 352 Ala. 636, 44 So. 859.
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appears to be in the power of the party to produce must be offered."
Both cases clearly apply the stricter American doctrine.
The Supreme Court of ARKANSAS, in a long and well reasoned
decision, 60 adopted the more liberal interpretation of the American
rule, and has applied it in all subsequent decisions. In two inter-
esting cases they refused to allow the introduction of parol testi-
mony of the contents of lost documents because the law required
copies of such instruments to be made and filed and these presum-
ably could have been produced.6
As previously mentioned, the CALIFORNIA decisions are in con-
flict on this question.62
GEORGIA has committed itself to the strict interpretation of the
American rule,63 saying that "there are degrees in secondary evi-
dence, and that the best should always be produced."4
The Supreme Court of ILLINoIs has adopted the American theory
in its strict sense, 5 stating that "where the highest evidence can
not be had, then resort can be had to the next highest or secondary
evidence.66 But in the case of Protection Life Inc. v. Dill (1878),17
parol testimony of the contents of an insurance policy was admitted,
it appearing by the record that a copy was in court in custody of
the adverse party However, the question of degrees of secondary
evidence was not specifically passed on in the decision.
INDIANA started out by adopting the English rule in Carpenter v.
Dame (1858),11 the only authorities cited being English cases. This
decision was apparently overlooked the next time the question
arose for the court then unhesitatingly committed itself to the
theory that
"where a record is lost, its contents may be proved, like the
contents of any other document, by the best available sec-
ondary evidence. "69
This strict interpretation of the American rule was also applied
in Barnett v. Lucas (1901),7° and the state now seems to be definitely
committed to that doctrine.
80 Davies v. Pettit (1850), 11 Ark. 349.
O'Redd v. State (1898) 65 Ark. 475, 47 S. W 119" Kelley v. Laconia
Levee Dist. (1905) 74 Ark. 202, 85 S. W 249.
2 Supra, page 11 herein.
Bowden v. Archer (1895) 95 Ga. 243, 22 S. E. 254.
Is Supra note 23.
"Ellis v. Huff (1862) 29 Ill. 449.8 Supra note 7.
Supra note 9.
"Jones v. Levi (1880) 72 Ind. 586.0O 27 Ind. App. 441, 61 N. E. 683.
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TowA has consistently followed the American rule in its strict
application from the very first. 1 The well considered decision of the
court in Cummings v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins Co. (1911),72 is one of
the leading cases on the subject.
LouisiANA adopted the same theory m Mercier v. Harnan
(1887),7 in which the court made the very broad and inaccurate
statement that the American doctrine is.
"an elementary principle of the laws of evidence, found in
every work on evidence, and so completely consecrated by
established jurisprudence as to dispense with any citation
of authorities to support it."
As previously mentioned, the decision of both MCHIGAN 7 4 and
MinnESOTAF5 are in conflict on this question, and it is impossible
to say which theory will finally be adopted by either state.
MssouRi has always applied the strict American rule and as early
as 1829 we find the expression :76
"To admit secondary evidence, it must, under the eir-
cumstances, not only appear to be the best, but it must be
the best legal evidence."
This doctrine is still applied in the more recent decisions. 77
MONTANA has adopted this same theory,78 as had NEw JERSEy,79
the latter having accepted it as early as 1832.
Although the best reasoned decisions in NEw YORK, as previously
explained,8 ' have followed either the strict or the liberal inter-
pretation of the American rule, the latest case involving the ques-
tion82 adopted the English theory without question or argument.
While there is some authority in NORTH C~AoumA supporting
the American doctrine, 83 a review of the authorities seems to justify
71 Horseman v. Todhunter (1861), 12 Ia. 230; Higgzns 'v. Reed (1859), 8
Ia. 298, 74 Am. Dec. 305.
12 Supra note 27.
39 La. Ann. 94, 1 So. 410.
"Supra, page 12 herein.
7 Supra, page 12 herein.
11 Philipson v. Bates (1829), 2 Mo. 116, 22 Am. Dec. 305.
"Martin v. Brand, (1904), 182 Mo. 116, 81 So. 443; Zimmerman v. Bot-
torm Produce Co. (1917) 192 S. W 1038.
"Bellk v. Meagher (1878), 3 Mont. 65 (affirmed 104 U. S. 279, 26 L. Ed.
735).
"Rice v. Rice (1892), 25 AtI. 321.
0 Smith v. Axtel (1832), 1 N. J. Eq. 494.
n Supra, page 13 herein.
82 Supra note 46.
8 Supra notes 47 and 48.
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its classification with those states which hold that there are no
degrees of secondary evidence."4
The question has only been considered once in OHIO, at which
time the strict American rule was followed.85
This view of the law has likewise been adopted by PENNSYLVANIA,
having been consistently followed in all its decisions.86
TENNESSEE is another state which has aligned itself with those
who support the strict interpretation of the American theory 87 In
the first case involving the question to arise in that jurisdiction the
court said"" "The best secondary evidence the nature of the case
will admit of" is required.
The first VERMONT decision followed the strict American rule,8"
but in a later case and the only other one involving the problem,
the court adopted the liberal interpretation, though still holding
that there were degrees of secondary evidence.90
Th only VIRGINIA decision in which the question is even men-
tioned does not definitely pass on the point, but seems to indicate
that the court favors the American rule.9 1
WISCONSIN has also definitely committed itself to this theory,
applying the rule in its liberal form.9 2
CONCLUSION
It is to be noticed that WASHINGTON is one of several states
which has not yet passed on this question, and it is impossible to
say which doctrine will eventually be adopted.
An analysis of the theory of each of the two rules shows that the
so-called English theory is in harmony with the modern interpreta-
tion of the best evidence rule, while the doctrine credited to this
country is obviously only an extension of the old original concep-
tion of that rule. It is interesting to note that, even in spite of
this queer anomoly and the further fact that practically all the
writers on evidence have favored the English rule, a majority of
Supra, page 14 herein.
Diehl v. Stine (1886) 1 0. Cir. Dec. 287, 10 Ct. Ct. Rep. 515.
"Kerns v. Swope (1883) 2 Watts. 75, supra note 24.
, State v. True (1906) 116 Tenn. 294, 95 S. W 1028; Southern Ry. (o
v. Seymozur (1904) 113 Tenn. 523, 83 S. W 675.
Galbraith v. McFarland (1866) 3 Cald. 267, 91 Am. Dec. 281.
Mattocks v. Stearms (1837) 9 Vt. 326.
Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R. Co. (1856) 29 Vt. 127.
" Pendleton v. Commonwealth (1834) 4 Leigh. 694, 26 Am. Dec. 342.
" Sexsnmith v. Jones (1861, 13 Wis. 565. Johnson v. Ashland Lumber Co.
(1881) 52 Wis. 458, 9 N. W 464.
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the states have adopted the American theory and insist that there
are degrees of secondary evidence.
The explanation of this may be that in many of the jurisdic-
tions the courts first passed on the question before the best evi-
dence doctrine was reduced to its final form and so fell into the
natural error of thinking that the best obtainable evidence was
always required, irrespective of whether it was primary or second-
ary in nature. Some judges have also probably been mislead by
the inaccurate term, "American rule."
While the function of this article is only to explain both sides
of this question, and not to determine which is the most desirable
or most satisfactory rule, we will say that it might well be contended
that, if the problem were to arise today as an original proposition
in these same courts, the decisions of those who follow the Amer-
ican doctrine might very well be otherwise-that the so-called Eng-
lish theory would probably be adopted as one more consistent with
the modern interpretation of the best evidence rule.
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